On a strategic course or an also strategic railway one speaks of a railroad line, which does not serve its own traffic need, but one built and one operated primarily under military criteria.

Germany

Prehistory

As soon as the railway arose as means of transport, was naturally the interest of the military there. 1836 were already formed a commission from Prussian officers and official, who should examine the meaning of the railway for military purposes and which submitted their report on 4 July 1836. It was stated the fact that the railway earns "in military relationship all attention "and became uniform standard specifications regarding dimensioning and maximum stress demanded. The plant from militarily wished railways to to promote, if no economic interests were present, was still rejected from the Department of State 1836. In a cabinet order from 13 August 1837 by the king it was then instructed, "in the military interest on the statement of the construction of the trade there (zuwirken) that the latters without prejudice to its actual regulation, which is to be if possible adapted to military needs. "

1839 was already accomplished in Prussia the first troop transportation. 8,000 men guard infantry was transported in 10 courses from potsdam to Berlin. The enthusiasm was accordingly. The first use of rail transports in "times of war "in Germany date from the year 1849, when to striking down revolutionary of Baden and the Prussian troops with the railway were transported by South West German country.

The first only railway built for military reasons developed during the Krimkriegs. 1855 built between the port of Balaklawa and the camp of the British-French FE storage army before Sewastopol one about nine kilometers are enough improvised Feldbahn. This was however no strategic course in the actual sense. The supply was managed by British-French side exclusively by ships.

Also as the technical facilities regarding the infrastructure, were missing the practical experiences in logistics were present. This pointed itself to the crisis in the autumn 1850. The Prussian mobilization went down regarding chaos, the Austrians could 75,000 soldiers and 8,000 horses to the schlesische border with the course transport, but in a time, which one would have used also to foot. The speed of the foot marches was not exceeded, however one saved to the troop the strains and high march losses.

In the campaign of the Frenchmen and Piemonteser in the year 1859 against Austria then again experiences in the railway marching-up could be won. The troop transport went approximately in sixfold speed in relation to foot marches. Per day by the French railway 8,500 soldiers were transported and over 500 horses in the marching-up area. In addition, errors were made here: The supply was not organized, it was missing fast at food supply, covers and medicines. Abandoned trucks clog the massive stations. This was the first war, in which railways attained a tactical and operational meaning.

In the American war of secession (1861-65) the railway was then used systematically as strategic element in the war guidance. Thus the railway became also object and a goal of the war guidance. It was the birth of the railway pioneers, who had to again develop destroyed distances and bridges. Here also for the first time railway cannons, tank cars and military hospital cars were then used. In addition, the disadvantages of the privately developed Eisenbahnnetzes came to day: thus there were six different track widths, the distances with outbreak of the war from economic and on the basis of military criteria was not put on.

The international happening was naturally observed by the German military guidance attentively. In Germany Helmuth Karl Bernhard count von Moltke (since 1857 at the point of the general staff) was substantial, who recognized the strategic meaning of the railway and in the general staff 1864 its own railway section furnished. This had to constantly update according to the politico strategic situation, the time boards for the rail transport. If one still proceeded 1859 from 42 days from the mobilization to the operation readiness of the troops, then 1866 the time difference could be reduced on 25 days. For the first time meaning got this in the war against Austria. For the marching-up in for order with a readiness of application after 45 days, Prussia however five lines stood for the Austrians a railway line. This had however the disadvantage that the output front line was expanded since over 300 kilometers, which made it very vulnerable. For this Moltke was violently blamed by its professional colleagues. The fast railway marching-up that Prussia made up for however this disadvantage again. Moltke coins/shapes for this then the term "separately marches - united strike". So the Prussian troops already were in the use, when the Austrians were still in the marching-up. The enclosure of the Austrians with was considerably possible by the fast marching-up only.

By the tactically operational meaning of the railway developed then also its own automatism, which became important with later wars. The initial phase of a war and the strategic initial position got a completely new weight. As soon as the first step of the escalation leaders, who mobilization is accomplished, must is also fast slammed shut, in order to also realize the time advantages. The possibilities for the Deeskalation on political level, e.g. by diplomacy, are only very small. The tactically operational meaning of the railway became most clearly then visible in the Russian-Japanese war of 1904/05. It broke out because the Japanese wanted to establish "clear conditions", before Russia could complete the Trans-Siberian railway and strengthen thus its bases at the Pacific coast at will.

Also in the French-German war 1870/71 the railway marching-up had a crucial meaning. In planning 1869 (the exact timetables had to be developed) still from 24 days if time difference had proceeded from the mobilization to the operation readiness, were then to beginning of war only 20 days. The Frenchmen needed six weeks.

Strategic building of railways

Strategic building of railways however is called to build distances due to military and not due to economic requirements and civilian transportation needs. The more distances by national side were built, all the more played also military criteria a role. For this two substantial conditions were to be fulfilled:

• The state had to create the infrastructure. Railways were financed up to then to the predominant part with private capital, built and operated by private societies, whereby the state committed itself however frequently to guaranteed interests.
• In order to build in the larger style (uneconomic) distances, the state must have the money. This was given by the French reparation payments.

The nationalizations in 70's the 19. Century had surely also a reason in the increasing military-strategic meaning of the railway. At the latest 1871 was accomplished first considerations for the strategic building of railways of the cannon course long over 800 km, whose routing had to a large extent no or only small civilian verkehrliche meaning. With the law from 11 June 1873 (the so-called cannon course law) the building of the course was decided, made available funds from the French reparation payments and seized the authorization to debenture bonds for the cannon course.

In Germany particularly before the First World War systematically such railways were built. Special meaning got this, when the relationship to Russia worsened starting from 1878 after the conference of Balkans rapidly and on a two-front war with France and Russia furnished itself to Germany. The marching-up plans at that time planned to create the troops with the help of all available railroad lines to the west front to thrash France in a fast campaign to create afterwards the same troops with the railway toward the east, in order to lead with Russia war. The strategic courses were then built within the German Eisenbahnnetzes in places, in which the existing distances did not affect efficiently published or foreign territory. These distances were built primarily at the west border of Germany in relation to the border to France and Belgium. During the First World War by German side further strategic courses were then built particularly in Belgium.

For the strategic courses the generous way of their building was characteristic. The courses on them should be able to transport the heaviest cannons on goods trains, without the locomotives pushed to their power limits. The meant primarily the delimitation of the distance upward gradient on 1% and turning radii of 300 M. as consequence of these delimitations had to be established in the low mountain ranges a disproportionately large portion of bridges and tunnel, which raised the price of the enterprise in times of peace substantially. Because of their military character the distances ran far away the large cities in the German Reich, thus were small their value in peacetime.

Further also completely normal railroad lines for the enterprise were prepared by military courses. That means that this were more generously located, than it would have required that enterprise actually which can be expected. At them it is noticeable for example that for the admission of the excessive transportation the tracks and platforms could to have and also today still have the length of up to a kilometer within a station.

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