Models in Behavioral economics usually refer to certain observed anomalies of market and modify conventional neoclassical models, by describing economic Entscheider in such a way that they act partially arbitrarily (heuristically) or by Framing effects are affected. Generally the theory of the Behavioral is economics in the context of the neoclassical theory, although the conventional acceptance of economic acting is frequently doubted.
Heuristic
Folder theory - loss dislike - tendency to the status quo () - deceit conclusion of the player (- self confirmation ()
Framing
Cognitive arranging () - mental calculating () -- Anchors
Anomalies
- Security impact mysteries (: EN: Equity premium puzzle) - money illusion, () - Fairness () - efficiency wages, () - reciprocity, () - inter+temp-oral consumption () - Present biased preferences - Behavioral life cycle hypothesis - dares stickiness - Price stickiness - Visceral of influences - arbitrage borders () - Income and happiness - Momentum Investments ()
Critic of the Behavioral economics stress typically the reason economically of the actions (see Myagkov and Plott (1997), under others). They maintain, which cannot be transferred experimentally observed behavior to market situations, because learning opportunities and competition will guarantee that it will come at least to a far approximation to reasonable behavior. Others do not mark that cognitive theories are like the folder theory only models of deciding, generalizable economic behavior, and they therefore are only applicable on the unique decision problems, which are placed to the participants of the experiment or the questioning participants.
Traditional Wirtschaftler are likewise sceptical concerning the techniques used with the experiments and questionings, which play into behavioral economics the large role. Wirtschaftler stress the meaning of the actual preferences contrary to the preferences indicated for questionings "", in order to determine an economic value. Experiments and questionings must be prepared carefully, in order to avoid systems-inherent partialnesses, strategic behavior and the absence of incentive comparability (lacquer OF incentive compatibility). Many Wirtschaftler distrust to the results, which are won in this way because of the difficulties with exclusion of these possibilities. Rabin (1998) rejects these criticisms, by stating that D the results in different situations and countries can be placed behind, and they can lead to good theoretical views.
Colin Camerer - Daniel Kahneman - David Laibson - George RST whom stone - Matthew Rabin - Robert Shiller - Richard Thaler - Amos Tversky - Ronald Coase - Lola Lopes - Sarah light stone - Paul Slovic - Andrew Lo - Andrei Shleifer
Herbert Simon - Gerd Gigerenzer - Fischer Black - John Tooby - Leda Cosmides - Paul Rubin - Donald ruby Martin weber - University of Mannheim
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