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Asymmetrical information distribution with co-operation can affect itself both before and after conclusion of a co-operation contract. Ex ante places itself the problem of the selection of the correct partner. The asymmetrical information prevents favourable contractual relations. It comes off a bad contract or even at all no contract. Ex post office, i.e. in a co-operation, can affect asymmetrical information distribution the stability of co-operation negatively. Therefore one must try to get the problem of the asymmetrical information into the grasp. Thereby different mechanisms exist for the dismantling of asymmetrical information or for the avoidance of the consequences resulting from it. One calls the costs developing thereby in relation to the ideal solution (in the broadest sense) Agency costs.
On the basis a venture as special co-operation form asymmetrical information distributions between the co-operation partners as Prinzipalen and the co-operation managers sent into the joint venture can Joint be clarified as agents. The selected co-operation managers can hide determined characteristics in the apron consciously, e.g. by signaling larger readiness of application or pretend better Sprachkenntnisse (hidden characteristics). Besides the Prinzipale can the behavior of the agent not sufficiently by delegation due to the unawareness of cultural differences judge or due to geographical distance not observe. From this action clearance for achievement restraint develops for the agent (hidden information/hidden action). The specific investments of the Prinzipale into the joint venture can be exploited by the not contractual behavior of the agent, e.g. due to the menace of the drift or a careless business activity, (hidden intention).
Here the removal of information asymmetry or the adjustment of interest is applicable as solution methods.
In addition the principle aluminum agent theory offers solution types:
By Signalling the agent can signal its characteristics. Here the agent takes on costs, in order to produce a certain signal, here must the use of signal production (advantages less costs) for desired agents positively, for unwanted agents against it be negative. Examples of Signalling are university diplomas, DEK rising up needing car seals and the like.
If the Prinzipal takes on against it costs, in order to experience, one designates more over the relevant characteristics of the agents than Screening. Example for this are Assessment centers, test runs and the like.
By a suitable contract menu one can reach Self selection. Here the Prinzipal offers different contracts, so that for the different types of agents only in each case one contract is optimal. Example are insured sums with differently high self participations. Bad risks select the usually substantially more expensive tariff without self participation, while good risks accept a higher self participation with lower contributions.
A further possibility consists of designing contracts in such a way that only desired agents would sign these. Only they possess a self-interest to offer under these conditions the achievement. Examples are warranties, Reputationen etc.
Here main means is for the dismantling of the risks the adjustment of interest, for example by result participation of the agent. The agents will fulfill the achievement desired of the Prinzipal from self-interest. Examples are share option plans for managers, in addition, product liability laws, Reputation and the like. Here is the problem that the Principal agent theory proceeds from a risk-neutral Prinzipal, but a risikoaversen agent, so that during a result participation the agent must carry a increased risk, which is connected with costs for him.
By monitorings the Prinzipal can try to make the actions of the agent observable and sanctionable. This causes however monitoring costs.
The Hold one can meet UP danger only by means of adjustment of interest. Examples are collateral, more long-term contracts and (mutual hold UP situation).
Independently of it, whether the state offers solutions (national certifying, national conclusions as Signalling, product liability law, warranty law, minimum standard), or whether the Contracting Parties want to solve the problems, which result from information asymmetry by their bilateral contract, always the ideal solution, which would be attainable with complete and complete contracts in the Neoklassik, comes does not come off not to Agency costs.
There the state however standardized institutions , assumes the new makes available these national institutions facilitate the conclusion of a contract for the Contracting Parties, since they can take reference to these institutions. Example: If I go as a customer into a department store, I do not have to read myself the AGB put out somewhere, since these may not disadvantage me inadequately. The department store again must spend few costs, in order to promise me a guarantee, since this is already legally prescribed.
Since however - despite nationally standardized institutions - further private signals are set (for example to give some automakers three years warranty), do not exclude the national adjustment a market solution not. It sets only certain ones of minimum standard, for example in the consumer protection, within some ranges since the state assumes no justifiable market solution adjusts itself. Since it never comes however on the assumption of limited to an efficient market equilibrium in the sense of the Neoklassik, it falls heavily to meet here Vorteilhaftigkeitsaussagen particularly if one - as in the consumer protection - includes also except-economic value statements (health) into the argumentation also.
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